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A Proposal to Reformulate Article 23 of




The operations of the proposed International Criminal Court (the
Court)1 will no doubt be intimately related to the functions of the
United Nations Security Council (the Security Council). As envisaged
by the International Law Commission (ILC), the Court would be em-
powered to take jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide and aggres-
sion, serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed
conflict, crimes against humanity, and other crimes punishable under
certain treaty regimes. 2 The situations that would give rise to such
crimes will most likely impact upon international peace and security
and therefore be dealt with by the Security Council. As a result, it is
imperative to strike a proper balance between the role of the pro-
posed International Criminal Court and that of the Security Council.
The attempt by the ILC to do so, as embodied in Article 233 of its
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, is less than satisfac-
* Law clerk at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yunoslavia. The
views expressed herein are solely those of the author in his personal and private capacity.
Thanks go to Roeland Bos, John Jones, and the editors of the Hastings International and
Comparative Law Review.
1. It has been the aspiration of the international community to establish such a crimi-
nal court since shortly after World War IL In 1994, the International Law Commission
(ILC) adopted a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (ILC Draft Statute).
See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Farty-S&rth Session,
U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43-160, U.N. Doc. A149)10 (1994) [hereinafter
ILC Report]. In 1994, the General Assembly decided to establish an Ad Ho Committee
to work on the matter. See G.A. Res. 53, U.N. GAOR 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. AIRES49!53
(1994). In 1995, the General Assembly decided to establish a Preparatory Committee to
further study the issues arising out of the ILC Draft Statute. See G.A. Res. 46, U.N.
GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. AIRES50,46 (1995). A draft of this commentary was infor-
mally presented to certain members of the Preparatory Committee during its first meeting
held in New York from March 25 through April 12, 1996.
2. ILC Draft Statute, art. 20, in ILC Report, supra note 1, at 70.
3. Article 23 of the ILC Draft Statute provides:
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tory. Chief among the criticisms lodged against the ILC draft Article
23 is that it would substantially hinder the independence of the Court
and interfere with its judicial functions. In its current form, Article 23
would permit the Security Council to control the Court by merely
placing an item on its own agenda and dealing with the matter itself.
With respect to the crime of aggression in particular, Article 23 would
preclude the Court from functioning merely because of inaction by
the Security Council, and would mandate that the Security Council
substitute for the Court in its decision-making role with respect to the
existence of aggression, an essential element of the crime of aggres-
sion.- The role envisaged by the ILC for the Security Council with
respect to the crime of aggression is contrary to the basic norms of
judicial function and has caused some to advocate removing the crime
of aggression from the jurisdiction of the Court.'
The current ILC Draft Statute would give the Security Council
more power than it has under the United Nations Charter (the Char-
ter), both with respect to the general functioning of the Court and
with respect to the crime of aggression in particular. The crime of
aggression-the crime of crimes-should be part of the jurisdiction of
the Court. Otherwise, the diplomatic conference for the establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court would bear, in the annals of
human history, the stigma of making retrogressive development of in-
ternational law. The current proposal would only empower the Court
to remedy minor symptoms, rather than enable it to eliminate one of
Action by the Security Council
1. Notwithstanding article 21, the Court has jurisdiction in accordance with
this Statute with respect to crimes referred to in article 20 as a consequence of the
referral of a matter to the Court by the Security Council acting under Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. A complaint of or directly related to an act of aggression may not be
brought under this Statute unless the Security Council has first determined that a
State has committed the act of aggression which is the subject of the complaint.
3. No prosecution may be commenced under this Statute arising from a situ-
ation which is being dealt with by the Security Council as a threat to or breach of
the peace or an act of aggression under Chapter VII of the Charter, unless the
Security Council otherwise decides.
ILC Draft Statute, art. 23, in ILC Report, supra note 1, at 84-85.
4. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 28, para. 125, U.N. Doe. A/50/22 (1995)
[hereinafter Ad Hoc Committee Report].
5. Id. para. 123.
6. Id.; see also International Commission of Jurists, Third Position Paper on the Inter-
national Criminal Court, Aug. 1995.
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the primary causes of breaches of international peace and security-
the crime of aggression.
I believe that draft Article 23 can be reformulated to place the
Court in a position essentially analogous to that of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), strengthen the Court's independence, preserve
the prerogatives of the Security Council under the Charter and, last
but not least, retain the Court's jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression.
H. Proposed New Arficle 23
The proposal for a reformulation of Article 23 is as follows:
1. Notwithstanding article 21, the Court has jurisdiction in accord-
ance with this Statute with respect to crimes referred to in article 20
as a consequence of the referral of a matter to the Court by the
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations. Such referral is not, however, binding on either the
Prosecutor or any Chamber of the Court with respect to whether
there is enough evidence for initiating an investigation or prosecu-
tion proceeding against an individual or for individual
responsibility.
2. The Security Council may, on its own motion or upon request by
any interested person or government, pardon, commute or reduce
the sentence imposed by the Court on a person convicted of the
crime of (a) aggression, (b) threat of aggression, or (c) a crime
against the peace, if the interests of peace and justice so require.
Such action by the Security Council shall not have any effect on the
conviction itself.
3. The Court shall stay any judicial proceeding (other than investi-
gative operations) upon the request by the Security Council when it,
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, con-
cludes that such a stay is necessary as part of its enforcement meas-
ures to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such a
stay shall be lifted and the proceeding shall continue, however,
when:
(a) the Security Council notifies the Court that such stay is no
longer necessary; or
(b) all relevant sanctions including both military and economic
sanctions, if any, imposed by the Security Council have been sus-
pended or terminated; or
(c) in the absence of active involvement of the Security Coun-
cil, the Court decides that such stay is no longer necessary to main-
1996]
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tain or restore international peace and security, having given due
regard to the relevant actions and views of the Security Council.
HI. Commentary
A. Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1 of the proposed Article 23 is essentially the same as
the first paragraph of the ILC draft Article 23. This paragraph is de-
sirable as it provides a mechanism for the Security Council to utilize
the Court, without the consent of the affected States, when it deems
such use necessary to maintain or restore international peace and se-
curity. Otherwise, the Security Council would have to, where neces-
sary, create ad hoc tribunals such as the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda. However, the last sentence of the proposed
paragraph has been added to ensure that the independence of the
Prosecutor and the Court do not suffer merely because of a referral
from the Security Council.
B. Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2 is a substantial revision of the ILC draft Article 23.
Paragraph 2 as drafted by the ILC gives the Security Council the ex-
clusive power to determine the existence of the act of aggression. The
ILC language would make it a necessary condition precedent to the
bringing of a complaint related to an act of aggression that the Secur-
ity Council has first determined that a State has committed the act of
aggression. Its commentary intimates that such a finding by the Se-
curity Council would also be binding upon the Court, leaving it only
the remaining task of determining the role of individuals involved in
the act of aggression much in the same style of a compensation com-
7. ILC Report, supra note 1, at 86 ("Any criminal responsibility of an individual for
an act or crime of aggression necessarily presupposes that a State had been held to have
committed aggression, and such a finding would be for the Security Council acting in ac-
cordance with Chapter VII of the Charter to make. The consequential issues of whether
an individual could be indicted, for example, because that individual acted on behalf of the
State in such a capacity as to have played a part in the planning and waging of the aggres-
sion, would be for the Court to decide."). Although there is some ambiguity in the ILC
draft Article 23 and its commentary, it has been understood that the current draft would
give the finding of the Security Council binding effect. See Ad Hoc Committee Report,
supra note 4, at 15, 28; Int'l Commission of Jurists, supra note 6. See also Draft Code of
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 15, paras. 4(h), 5, in Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 49th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 244, U.N. Doe. A146110 (1991). The status of this provision is un-
[Vol. 19:529
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mission administering individual claims after a country such as Iraq
has been determined to be liable for all amounts.
Several criticisms may be made of the ILC formulation. First,
giving the Security Council the exclusive power to determine the
existence of the act of aggression is unwarranted. Under Article 24 of
the Charter, the Security Council has "primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security." The ICI has held,
however, that "primary" responsibility is not exclusive responsibility 8
There is nothing in the Charter that excludes a judicial decision with
respect to the act of aggression. Second, the ILC Draft Statute would
require prior action by the Security Council in order to institute an
action relating to aggression. In this way, the Security Council's inac-
tion could prevent any judicial proceedings on aggression from taking
place.
Third, endowing a finding of the Security Council which relates to
an act of aggression with binding force is unsupported by the Charter
and violates basic norms of judicial functions and human rights. No-
where does the Charter give the Security Council any power to substi-
tute its decisions for those of judicial bodies. The ILC Draft Statute
does not distinguish judicial decisions by the Court and political deci-
sions by the Security Council. The determination of an act of aggres-
sion by the Security Council is solely for the purpose of exercising its
own functions in maintaining and restoring international peace and
security. On the other hand, a judicial decision by the Court on an act
of aggression is intended for the determination of individual responsi-
bility. Permitting the Security Council, a political body, to decide cer-
tain elements of a crime entailing individual responsibility violates the
basic human rights norm that requires judicial determination of every
element of the crime. For this reason, it is likely that the Court would
invalidate the ILC draft provision to the extent that it would invest
Security Council findings of aggression with binding force; theories for
and judicial decisions asserting the power to review Security Council
decisions have now emerged.9 Whatever powers a criminal court has
or does not have, it should never cooperate with violations of funda-
clear at this moment. Recently the Special Rapporteur has recommended deleting much
of this article. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Wbrk of tts Forty-
Seventh Session, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 33-39, U.N. Doc. AJ5f!10 (1995).
8. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1984 I.CJ. 392, 434 (Nov. 26).
9. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 5-24 (Appeals Chamber, tha Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo. 1995).
1996]
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mental norms of human rights. If necessary, the Court should stay
clear of such violations by declining to exercise jurisdiction. Of
course, this is not to say that decisions of the Security Council acting
under Chapter VII should have no value. These determinations will
inform the decisions of the Court, but the Court must have the ulti-
mate power to reach its own determination.
The reformulated paragraph 2 would leave the Court free to
reach its own conclusions on acts of aggression while, at the same
time, preserving the prerogatives of the Security Council under the
Charter by giving it the power to pardon or reduce the penalty with-
out removing the conviction. This is analogous, although not identi-
cal, to the power that the Charter gives to the Security Council
regarding non-compliance with ICJ judgments. Under Article 94(2)
of the Charter, if any party to a case fails to carry out a judgment of
the ICJ, the Security Council may in its wisdom, but is not obligated
to, make recommendations or take measures to enforce the judgment.
Wide discretion is granted to the Security Council. In making its deci-
sion whether to enforce a judgment of the ICJ, the Security Council
may consider a variety of factors, including political considerations. 10
If enforcing such a judgment would endanger international peace and
security, the Council should not (and presumably would not) enforce
it since it has the responsibility under the Charter to maintain interna-
tional peace and security. Thus, one may say that peace is given prior-
ity in this context over other considerations."
Similarly, the reformulated paragraph 2 would give the Security
Council the power to alter the punishment to be meted out by the
Court where appropriate. For example, if the Security Council be-
lieves that there are factors that the Court has failed to consider or
feels that a downward alteration of the sentence is necessary for the
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, it may
respond accordingly. Such power, of course, is not the power to re-
view the judgment of the Court, because the conviction cannot be
affected.
The reformulated paragraph 2 is consistent with the Nuremberg
precedent and State practice. The power to reduce or commute the
sentence without affecting the judgment of guilt was granted by the
10. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 234
(1992).
11. Cf. RIcHARD FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT 42 (1986).
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Nuremberg Charter to the Control Council for Germany.12 Eventu-
ally, the Control Council altered the sentences of several defendants.1 3
At the national level, the executive branch of the government gener-
ally has the power to pardon and to commute or reduce sentences. In
some countries, the power to pardon may be very broad and com-
pletely discretionary. The power granted by the reformulated para-
graph 2 is somewhat circumscribed in that the judgment of conviction
by the Court may not be affected by actions of the Security Council.
C. Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3 is also a substantial revision of the ILC Draft Stat-
ute. The ILC Draft Statute precludes the simultaneous consideration
by the Court of a situation being dealt with by the Security Council as
a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression under Chap-
ter VII, unless the Security Council decides otherwise. The ILC Draft
Statute has the effect of permitting the Security Council to prevent
any prosecution relating to such a situation merely by placing an item
on its agenda and dealing with the situation itself. If there is inaction
by the Security Council after it has placed the relevant item on its
agenda, the Court will forever be precluded from acting on the matter.
This would have a serious effect on the Court as almost all prosecu-
tions contemplated for this Court will be, in one way or another, re-
lated to such a situation. This treatment is unjustified. The expressed
basis for this provision is Article 12 of the Charter.1 4 However, the
ILC Draft Statute has read more into Article 12 than it deserves. As
the ICJ has held, "[w]hile in Article 12 there is a provision for a clear
demarcation of functions between the General Assembly and the Se-
curity Council, in respect of any dispute or situation, that the former
should not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or
situation unless the Security Council so requires, there is no similar
provision anywhere in the Charter with respect to the Security Coun-
cil and the [ICJ]."' s Similarly, there should not be such a provision
12. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 29, reprinted in TELrOnD TAY-
LOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRiALs 653 (1992).
13. See id. at 600-18.
14. ILC Report, supra note 1, at 87. Article 12 of the Charter provides-
While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the
functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not
make any recommendation wvith regard to that dispute or situation unles the
Security Council so requests.
U.N. CHARTER art. 12, para. 1.
15. Nicaragua v. U.S., 1984 I.CJ. 392, 435 (Nov. 26).
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with respect to the Security Council and the proposed Court. More-
over, as the ICJ ruled, there was nothing irregular in the simultaneous
exercise by the ICJ and the Security Council of their respective func-
tions.16 Judicial functions and actions of the Security Council are
complementary more often than not.
This is not to say, however, that the Security Council should not
have any influence in the proceedings of the Court. Although the re-
formulated paragraph 2 would not permit the Security Council to re-
quest a stay of investigations, it would permit the Security Council to
request a stay of the judicial proceedings, a request which the Court
must respect. This is intended to preserve the prerogatives of the Se-
curity Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. Although
there is no justification for precluding the Court from exercising its
judicial functions as soon as a situation is addressed by the Security
Council, once the Security Council has made its decisions with respect
to the situation, its enforcement measures must reign supreme unless
such measures would violate jus cogens.'7 Under Articles 25 and 103
of the Charter, decisions of the Security Council must be carried out.
As the creature of a treaty made mostly by member States of the
United Nations, the Court should also carry out decisions of the Se-
curity Council so long as the essential judicial character of the Court is
not impaired. Granting a stay of a judicial proceeding without termi-
nating the entire proceeding is the appropriate solution. Under this
formulation, merely placing an item on the agenda of the Security
Council would not preclude judicial consideration of the same matter.
Nor would inaction by the Security Council prevent the Court from
functioning. The Security Council must affirmatively reach a decision
and make a request to the Court before the Court is required to grant
a stay. Finally, the Court is not required to stay investigations, as
timely investigation is essential to preserving evidence. However, the
Court may, in its wisdom and in the interests of justice, grant such a
stay.
The reformulated paragraph 3 also lays down the conditions for
lifting the stay granted upon the request of the Security Council. The
16. Id; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. 3,21 (May
24).
17. See Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Hercegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro)), 1993 I.CJ. 325, 440-41 (Sept. 13) (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht,
judge ad hoc). The questions whether and how Security Council decisions should be sub-
ject to judicial review are beyond the scope of this commentary.
[Vol. 19:529
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stay, of course, should be lifted upon notification by the Security
Council that it is no longer necessary. In the absence of such notifica-
tion, if all relevant sanctions are no longer in effect or, if the Security
Council is not actively involved in the situation at all and if the Court
determines that the stay is no longer needed, the stay should also be
lifted. These provisions will cover basically all situations when the
stay is no longer necessary.

